A Day Like No Other

Experiences and Lessons Learned During the Las Vegas Mass Shooting

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- Approximately 83 square miles
- Roughly ¾ of the State’s population lives in Clark County
- Las Vegas is the 30th largest city in the USA
- Las Vegas is the largest hotel market in the USA with 172 hotels and more than 149,300 hotel rooms
- Las Vegas is home to 3 of the world's 10 largest convention centers
- 43 million visitors come to Las Vegas every year.
Route 91 - Harvest Festival

- 3 Day country music festival
- 22,000 attendees
- Outdoor Venue is approximately 15 acres
- All attendees were issued RFID arm-bands.
- The concert started at 3pm
- Jason Aldean takes the stage at 9:40pm
“...Dispatch, Engine 11

There’s a large crowd running from the music festival down here. Do you have reports of anything?

It sounds like gunfire...”
October 1, 2017 at 10:05pm a lone gunman opens fire with rapid fire, long-guns, from an elevated, distant perch.

There were 22,000 concert attendees

More than 700 people were injured

530 +/- individuals required emergency medical care

58 concert-goers were killed

NATO 5.56 was the ammo; Resulting in direct hits being DOAs. Most GSW injuries were from ricocheted bullets and bullet fragments
A Complex Incident

- 20 Individual patient locations with approximately 180 patients
- During the response there are 5 additional active shooter calls on “The Strip”
- >350 patients transported to local hospitals without any EMS interventions
The Hospital Experience

No Notice
High Volume
High Acuity
High Risk
Heightened Emotions
High Stress

Zero Situational Awareness
Patient Distribution (by number of patients initially received)

Mortalities include:
- DOAs
- Unsalvageable
- Intra-operative
- Withdraw of care
THE HOSPITAL RESPONSE
Emergency Operations Plans

- Code Triage – “All hands on deck”
- Initiate Hospital Incident Command System
- Initiate Lock Down and Security Plan
- Initiate Emergency Communications Plan
- Initiate Emergency Operations Center
- Initiate Hospital Surge Plan
- and triage, stabilize and treat incoming patients...

Without Any Notification

- on a Sunday night
  - with minimal staffing
  - with low supply PAR levels
  - Zero situational awareness
Las Vegas shooting: Iraq veteran steals pick-up truck to save lives after hearing gunfire
Ex-marine drives dozens of wounded to hospital after being caught up in festival massacre

Mr. Winston, a sergeant who served from 2006 to 2011, told the injured to apply pressure to wounds as he attempted to speed to Desert Springs Hospital “before they bled out”.

He fears some of his passengers, who included a woman with neck and chest injuries, may have died.

“I can’t be for certain,” he said. “There’s a few that I don’t think probably made it. They were pretty limp when we were pulling them out of the truck, but they still had a pulse, so I’m hoping for the best.”
• Received 200 patients from the music festival
• Majority of patients arrive via private autos
• ED census reaches 228 by 02:47
• 124 Gun Shot Wounds (GSW)
• 92 patients have no identification
• 5 major surgeries within the first hour and a half
• 58 surgeries in the first 24 hours
• 20 ORs operating simultaneously
• 516 Blood products administered
• Received 60 patients from the scene
• Received 44 patients as interfacility transfers
• 4 patient mortalities
• 12 critical trauma
• 20 surgeries in first 24 hours
• 70 units of blood used
• 60 patients admitted
• 44 patients treated and released
• 239 bed community (non-trauma center) hospital

• Mapping apps, showed Desert Springs as the closest hospital to the concert

• First patients began arriving while the shooter was still active, and before any “city-wide” alerts

• 58 critical patients

• “We ran out of everything”

• Upwards of 25-30 patients treated and released without creating a health record
• Community (non-trauma) Hospital

• Received first shooting patient before shooting stops

• 50 patients received, predominately via private auto

• 3 mortalities

• “Today we are the trauma center”
Observations
Observations that require planning considerations

The BIGGIES...

▪ Electronic Health Records
▪ HIPAA
▪ Communications
▪ Surge Plans vs Throughput
▪ Non-Traditional Patient Transportation
▪ Mental Health
▪ Mutual Aid Agreements

More than 40 additional considerations identified...so far
Electronic Health Records –
“Charting? Forget about it!”

Patient registration too slow

Too many mandatory screens or required fields to fill-in

Unable to group patients by event

Some systems don’t assign trauma alias’

Difficult to enter data retrospectively

Some systems don’t run reports until the following day
HIPAA –
“PHI trumps FBI all day, everyday”

Lots of confusion related to what is Protected Health Information (PHI) and what is not

Exemptions related to emergencies, terrorism and/or declared disasters

Law enforcement organizations (LEO) do not fall under HIPAA

No community standard

No predefined essential elements of information that LEO needs during an event
Communications –
“Internal and External, It’s all problematic”

**Internal Communications**

Not enough radios, wrong type of radio, who was supposed to charge these damn radios?

Phone trees – not prioritized by incident type. Too heavily focused on providers (needed EVS, Radiology, Surgery Techs, etc.)

VoIP crashed due to numbers of incoming and out-going calls. Not enough physical phones or people to answer them

Cell phones used universally. Large “dead spots” within hospitals with no service

Radio applications, downloaded on cell phones worked with Wi-Fi connection and talk groups could be established

No common lexicon
## Communications –
### External

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Families</th>
<th>Press</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manage expectations. Define the schedule for family briefings and stick to it</td>
<td>Social media addresses (to monitor) more valuable than press releases</td>
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<td>Communicate with families via social media if appropriate. Frequent tweets such as “200 patients treated so far, injuries range from twisted ankle to severe trauma” made families feel like they weren’t forgotten</td>
<td>Have a designated PIO… team</td>
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<td><strong>Equipment</strong></td>
<td>PIO team should provide accurate information, be the single point of contact for the press and should try and clear-up any misinformation on social media</td>
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<td>Families, employees and LEO will need phone chargers and access to outlets.</td>
<td><strong>Off-Duty Staff Members</strong></td>
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<td>Need to be able to segregate phone lines to be out-going numbers only, or you may never call out</td>
<td>Update the staff on the current situation at regular intervals</td>
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<td><strong>Protocol and Policy</strong></td>
<td>Staff that was told not to come in, needs to understand why. Staff felt disgruntled and “left-out” if they weren’t immediately called in</td>
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<td>Identify numbers to call: if you have a foreign national as a patient, how to talk with the FBI and local PD, Coroner’s Office, dignitaries, etc..</td>
<td><strong>Pre-Plan External Communications</strong></td>
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<td>Always get a call-back number first thing!</td>
<td>Before the event, determine who gets what information and how. Common hospital complaint was that too many organizations were calling or demanding the same information</td>
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Surge Plans –
“Bed availability means nothing”

Throughput, Throughput, Throughput

*It’s not how many inpatients you can handle that matters during the initial crisis... it’s how many people can you stabilize that saves lives.*

- Critical patients to surgery
- Treat and street as fast as you can
- Re-evaluate everyone who is currently admitted
- Transport minor or moderate injuries to more remote facilities
Lessons Learned
THROUGHPUT is what saves lives.

All efforts should be focused on getting patients quickly through the ED and into one of four dispositions:

1. Surgery
2. Admitted
3. “Treat and Street”
4. Transferred

ED is primarily for airway, stabilization and vascular access.

Managing patient flow is much more important than being able to “surge” by some percentage of beds.
The majority of critical patients arrived via private auto or Uber. Unloading patients from pick-up trucks and autos is very labor intensive. Plans need to incorporate the very real possibility that no triage, first-aid or paramedic advanced level treatments will have been completed prior to arrival. Likewise, hospital plans must incorporate interfacility transfer plans for instances when NO EMS units are available. Hospitals are physically designed, and patient workflow is based on the assumption critical trauma patients will arrive via ambulance.
Examples:

- Crosstrain HR personnel to perform case management or patient registration functions
- Develop plans that can be instituted based on “mid-night” staffing levels and Sunday afternoon PAR levels
- Conduct full-scale exercises on swing and graveyard shifts to build plan familiarity
- Develop abbreviated patient registration and charting for large scale events
- Modify master mutual aid agreements (MMAA) so that lower-level employees can activate
- Train and exercise HICS/EOC activation using only night shift personnel
- Standardize processes (IT downtime charting may be the same process for MCIs, etc.)
- Emergency credentialing and disaster declarations

# 3

Time is the enemy

All plans, procedures and exercises, should to be refined to streamline every process.
Training courses should be developed for the “Immediate Responder”

These classes should focus on “stop the bleed”, triage and airway management when the only available equipment and supplies you have is what you are wearing.

Lots of patients arrived with tourniquets. All were makeshift using shirts and belts. Few were effective.

Immediate responders (lay persons, off-duty first responders and off-duty medical staff) need training specific to MCI management using only on hand supplies.
Terminology confusion can cause patient care delays or incorrect hospital destination decisions.

Use of “codes” ineffective during MCI situation when multiple plans are being activated.

Imagine the overhead page for this MCI, with fear of additional shooter(s) on campus..

“Attention Code Triage, Multiple Code Blues in the ED, Code Silver, EM Team to EOC #1”

Clear text and common terminology will help eliminate confusion and help avoid misunderstandings.
1. Nevada Hospital Association (NHA) is publishing a comprehensive report based on all available:
After Action Reports, Police Reports, Interviews, InfoXChange Conference and our own experiences. Completed

2. The NHA will be conducting a workgroup to identify issues related to EHRs during (mega) MCIs and specifically EPIC. Patient registration, patient charting, revenue cycle and recovery phase management as well as the need for “canned” EEI reports will be explored. Completed

3. The NHA will be conducting a listening session related to HIPAA, hospitals and the LEO interface. We are hoping to develop a list of EEIs that LEO could requests without any HIPAA ramifications as well as define the process if specific patient information is required. Completed

4. The NHA will be developing a communications guide and protocol manual to be used internally. The role of the association as a “Multi-Agency Coordination Group”.

5. The NHA will be updating our Master Mutual Aid Agreement based on lessons learned during this and other incidents.
Also Completed...

- Uber’s VP now reports to the Unified Command Center during major events
- All hospitals and coroner’s offices are working to revise mass fatality plans, at the facility level
- Coalition(s) have been offering HICS training for hospital personnel
- Several bills have been introduced to deal with HIPAA issues
- Bill has been introduced to allow immediate licensing and credentialing of out of state hospital workers
- Fire and EMS have new protocols in which they will respond to area hospitals during MCIs (as well as to the scene)
- Discussions have begun with the “Academic Medical Center Consortium” regarding development of a mutual aid agreement
- Thousands of people have been trained in “Stop the Bleed” by area coalitions and responders
- A bill has been introduced to allow governmental entities to establish non-profit organizations to help distribute funds and collect donations
- Many state emergency management commissions have been rolled into one “Resilience Commission”
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“Thank you”

“It takes the whole community”